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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE CQUNCIL 
ON THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE K.9 
OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION INTRODUCTION 
1.  At the request of the European Parliament, the Commission undertook, in the context 
of its 1995 programme, to produce a report on the possible implementation of Article 
K.9  of the  Treaty  on  European Union.  This article  provides  for  the possibility of 
applying  Article  1  OOC  EC  Treaty to  action  in  six  of the  nine  areas  referred  to  in 
Article K.l, thereby transferring some competences from the area of Cooperation in 
.the fields of Justice and Home Affairs, governed by Title VI of the TEU ("the Third 
Pillar"), to the Community. The implementation of Article K.9 requires a unanimous 
decision of the Council, on the initiative of the Commission or a Member State, and 
the  adoption  of that  decision  by  all  Member  States  according  to  their  respective 
constitutional requirements. 
2.  The Council has already examined this question once. 
The declaration on asylum attached to the Final Act of the Treaty required it to do so, 
with particular and exclusive reference to asylum policy, "by the end of 1993" which 
meant, in practice, within two months of the entry into force of the Treaty. 
That  first  examination  was  based  on  a  report  provided  by  the  Commission  (doc. 
SEC(93)1687 of 4 November 1993) drawing attention to the several advantages which 
it could be assumed would flow,  in terms of effective decision-making, transparency 
and legal certainty, from transferring asylum policy to the Community "pillar" of the 
Treaty. The Commission's report suggested, however, that it probably would not make 
sense to think in terms of  triggering the potentially long drawn-out procedures inherent 
in  Article  K. 9 immediately  after the entry  into  force  of the  Treaty and  before the 
newly introduced provisions of Title VI had been given the chance to show what they 
could  produce.  The  Council,  in  its  conclusions  of 20  June  1994,  endorsed  the 
Commission's approach and agreed that it might be advisable to reconsider this matter 
at a later date,  in the light of  experience, by the end of 1995  at the latest. 
3.  Unlike in the case of its first report, the Commission can now base this second report 
not only on theoretical  considerations but also on two years practical experience of 
living with the provisions of the "Third Pillar" as a way of pursuing cooperation in the 
fields  of justice and  home  affairs.  For  convenience  the report is  divided  into  two 
chapters : 
the objective underlying Article K.9 
the appropriateness of looking to Article K. 9 as the best instrument for 
attaining that objective. THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE K.9 
4.  The objective of  the article is clear. It is to transfer certain questions from the "Third 
Pillar" to the Community "Pillar" - and not only to the Community "Pillar" in general, 
but to the particular Article 1  OOC  which has a number of specific characteristics : 
it is clearly situated in the chapter of  the Treaty which deals in general 
with  the  approximation  of laws  with  a  view  to  facilitating  the 
functioning  of the  common  market,  and  in  particular  with  the 
establishment of  the internal market, defined as an area without internal 
frontiers; 
although initially requiring decision-making by unanimity, it provides 
for  the  possibility  of a transfer  to  qualified  majority  voting  after  a 
certain period.  It should be ,noted however that Article K.9  specifies 
that  such  a  transfer  should· not  be  automatic,  but  would  require  a 
determination to that effect in the Article K.9  decision itself, in other 
words by unanimity; 
although conferring on the Commission the exclusive right of initiative 
which  characterises  the  whole  of the  Community  "Pillar",  it  also 
requires the Commission to  examine any request from Member States 
that it submit a proposal to  the Council; 
while  bringing  the  European  Parliament  systematically  into  the 
decision-making process, it does so under the least complete formula, 
i.e. that of simple consultation. 
5.  These  characteristics would make  it  seem at least partially suited to  addressing the 
obstacles  to  progress  in  the  "Third  Pillar"  to  which  attention  has  been  drawn  by 
numerous commentators, including in the separate reports on the implementation of 
the  TEU  submitted  by  the  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  Commission.  In  their 
different ways, these commentators have highlighted the following problems : 
a)  the slowness of  the decision-making process with the omnipresent requirement 
for  unanimity  in  the  Council  followed,  in  the  case  of  "Third  Pillar" 
Conventions, by the need for  ratifications in all Member States; 
b)  the continued lack oftransparency of the Council's work in this area which can 
in part be attributed to  the reluctance of the  Council  to  make known to  the 
Parliament  the  proposals  on  which  it  is  working  until  they  are  ready  for 
adoption or even already adopted; 
2 c)  the  absence  of  legal  certainty which only  the Court of Justice can provide. 
The faculty to give the Court of Justice competence in Title VI has resulted in 
repeated  blockages  of all  the  relevant  major  conventions  currently  under 
negotiation. Furthermore, the absence of clear views on the scope of the legal 
instruments, i.e. joint actions and joint positions, provided for by Article K.3, 
and the fact that the Commission has no role to play as guardian of the Treaty 
in this area, do not contribute to  legal certainty; 
d)  the absence also of any  clearly defined objectives to  which the catalogue of 
areas for cooperation listed in Article K.l can relate. 
6.  To a considerable extent, a transfer to  Article  lOOC  could eliminate these obstacles. 
It would at a stroke deal with the question of the involvement  of the European Court 
of Justice and introduce obligatory consultation of the European Parliament (albeit in 
its least advanced form).  By  situating the areas of cooperation firmly in the context 
of the approximation of laws in the common market and in particular in the context 
of establishing the  internal market,  it would provide framework objectives currently 
missing in Title VI.  By moving to article lOOC and opening the possibility, provided 
the  Council  so  decides,  of introducing  qualified  majority  voting,  decision-making 
could be facilitated and encouraged. 
IS ARTICLE K.9 THE MOST APPROPRIATE INSTRUMENT? 
7.  This report has been requested before the end of 1995, in other words just before 
the opening of the  1996 Intergovernmental  Conference. 
Although Title VI  is not specifically mentioned in the Treaty among the areas which 
will have to  be revisited  in  1996,  it seems  nevertheless that,  according to the  fifth  · 
indent of Article B of  the Treaty, the Conference will need to address institutional and 
practical questions related to the functioning of  cooperation in the fields of justice and 
home affairs.  That certainly appears to  be the thrust of the discussions so  fat in the 
Reflexion  Group  set  up  by  the  Essen  European  Council.  Any  examination of the 
"Third Pillar" in the context of the I.G.C. is in turn bound to address the question of 
its possible "communitarisation", either total or partial. 
8.  For  its  part,  the  Commission  has  made  public  its  clear  conviction  that 
"communitarisation" of 7 of the 9 areas listed in  Article K.l  is the right solution for 
all  the  reasons  mentioned  above.  Police  cooperation  and  judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal  matters represent the two  exceptions.  All  the  other areas,  with their close 
interface  with  work  done  under  the  Community  "Pillar",  in  particular  with  the 
objective  of the  free  movement  of persons,  would  benefit greatly  from  the  early 
application of the Community method of decision-taking and the full and automatic 
involvement of the  Community institutions.  While accepting that police cooperation 
and judicial cooperation in  penal matters are regarded by  the Member States as too 
close to  national  sovereignty  to  be  transferred in  the  short term  to the  Community 
"Pillar",  the  Commission  nevertheless  believes  thaf a  greater  involvement of  the 
institutions in these areas too  should be sought at the I.G.C. 
3 9.  This then is  the position  which  the  Commission  is  committed to  defending  in the 
I.G.C. Its objective corresponds closely with the one underlying the raison d'etre of 
Article K.9.  The  immediate question  is,  therefore,  whether that objective would be 
helped or hindered by the early tabling of a K.9  initiative.  This question should be 
examined bearing in mind the weaknesses of this provision which has not yet been 
enacted. Indeed as the Commission stated in its "Report on the Operation of  the Treaty 
on European Union"  (doc.  SEC(95)731  final  of 10  May  1995),  "the procedure laid 
down  is  cumbersome:  it  requires  the  Member  States'  unanimous  approval  and 
ratification in accordance with their respective national constitutional provisions". In 
one Member State this means that a national referendum will inevitably be triggered 
if Article K. 9 is invoked. 
10.  Against that background, the Commission has concluded that the objective, which it 
shares with the Parliament, of"  communitarisation" of  major aspects of  the Third Pillar 
would best and most effectively be  pursued in the context of the Intergovernmental 
Conference  rather than  through  an  Article  K. 9 initiative.  Without  prejudice  to  the 
possibility of turning to Article K.9  at  some future date if the circumstances warrant 
it,  the Commission's reasoning is based on the following considerations: 
(a)  the  coincidence  of timing  between  this  report  and  the  imminence  of the 
opening  of the  Intergovernmental  Conference  means  that  any  Article  K.9 
initiative taken in the Council now would soon be running in parallel with an 
examination  of the  same  or  similar  questions  in  the  I.G.C.  itself.  The 
Commission does not believe that there is room for such duplication, and that 
one forum is bound quickly to crowd out the other; 
(b)  faced with the choice, the Commission believes that the I.G.C. offers the more 
promising route. Not only does it provide a wider context, it also need not be 
bound by the limitations inherent in Article 1  OOC to which attention is drawn 
above. It would be possible in the I.G.C. context to  argue in favour of: 
the  involvement  of the  European  Parliament  going  beyond  simple 
consultation; 
transfer  to  the  Community  "Pillar"  of  more  than  the  six  areas 
mentioned in Article K.9; 
the introduction of qualified majority voting for certain aspects without 
the need for a separate unanimous decision to that effect by the Council 
at a later date; 
(c)  it would reinforce the case for a fundamental review of the Third Pillar in the 
I.G.C., rather than crediting, by the tabling of a K.9 initiative, the idea that the 
provisions of Title VI  are already sufficient on the grounds that they provide 
an adequate mechanism for "communitarisation". 
4 11.  On  balance,  the  Commission  therefore  believes  that  the  wiser  and  more 
productive course would be to  press the case for  "communitarisation" in the 
context of the  l.G.C., without first tabling a potentially distracting proposal 
based on Article K. 9. 
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